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Introduction

In honor of the publication of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and
Justice, the University of San Diego School of Law held a two day
symposium on the book. The essays in this collection emerge from that
symposium. Some of the essays respond to the authors’ arguments as a
whole or to specific aspects of these arguments. Other essays push
beyond the limits of the book, suggesting problems not raised by the
authors or otherwise challenging the book’s presupposition that genetic
interventions will transform our society.
First, Arti K. Rai, Assistant Professor at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, responds to chapters 3 and 4. In these
chapters, the authors argue that distributing genetic interventions in a
manner that restores individuals to normal functioning will preserve
equality of opportunity and thus will adequately address the distributive
justice dilemmas raised by such interventions. Moreover, according to
the authors, the conditions that prevent such normal functioning are
generally limited to inequalities that could be considered diseases. Thus,
according to the authors, a treatment versus enhancement distinction is a
plausible mechanism for allocating genetic intervention resources.
In Genetic Interventions: (Yet) Another Challenge to Allocating
Health Care, Rai suggests that the treatment versus enhancement
approach is both underinclusive and overinclusive. The authors’ approach
is overinclusive, reasons Professor Rai, because it does not adequately
limit the services society needs to provide all individuals; that is to say,
it fails to account for the scarcity dilemma. By the same token, the
exclusion of interventions for conditions that are not diseases is
underinclusive; enhancements that might further equality of
opportunity are excluded simply because they are not treatments for
recognized diseases. The authors anticipate that the concept of disease
will change over time and ultimately use the disease concept to
encompass all correctable genetic conditions that adversely impact
equality. This implies, according to Rai, that the distinction between
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treatment and enhancement is purely semantic. Loyalty to the
distinction should be abandoned and the underlying issue of equality
should be the focus of concern. After critiquing the method of resource
allocation set forth by the authors, Professor Rai sets forth several
alternative suggestions, noting the possible drawbacks of each.
Like Professor Rai, Professor Mark A. Hall of the Wake Forest
University School of Law and School of Medicine is concerned with the
authors’ proposed distinction between treatments and enhancements. In
Genetic Enhancement, Distributive Justice, and the Goals of Medicine,
Professor Hall focuses on chapter 4 of the book. Hall identifies this
chapter, which distinguishes between treatment of disease and
enhancement of genetic traits, as the one in which the authors appear to
have the greatest ideological disagreement. Professor Hall notes that
many of the moral and ethical issues surrounding the field of genetics
tend to revolve around the treatment versus enhancement distinction.
Professor Hall notes that what is currently normal may not always be
considered so. In examining the concept of distributive justice, which
focuses on achieving balance by closing gaps in equality, Hall argues
that a compromise must be made between holding certain people back in
violation of their liberties and exceeding what is practical in order to
elevate those in need. Hall concludes that the goal of distributive justice
should be to achieve as much equality of opportunity as is technically
feasible without compromising other important social and ethical
demands. For example, Hall identifies a shift in the later part of the
twentieth century from the treatment and prevention of disease to
increased attention on a more wholistic concept of health and wellbeing. This change in focus has resulted in an evolving concept of what
is medically necessary for health insurance to cover. Likewise, genetic
engineering has a tremendous potential to change our view of what is
normal and what are the proper goals of medicine. Professor Hall
concludes that the normal species functioning model may be the best
current guide, but its application by the authors fails to consider the very
real possibility that the goals of medicine may change dramatically.
In addition to challenging our assumptions regarding distributive
justice, genetics puts new pressures on individual and institutional
choice. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice introduces ethical
principles designed to guide individuals and institutions through genetics
issues. The authors took a middle road between the extreme paths of the
public health model, designed to improve the genetic health of society,
and the personal services model, which emphasizes individual choice.
In Punishing Reproductive Choices in the Name of Liberal Genetics,
Alexander Morgan Capron, Professor of Equity, Professor of Medicine,
and Co-Director of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics at the
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University of Southern California, praises the authors for carefully
structuring their arguments and thoroughly exploring the implications of
different concepts of justice for genetic interventions. Capron is
ultimately unpersuaded, however, by the authors’ conclusions because of
the way in which their moral reasoning applies to social policies.
To critique the authors’ ethical principles, Capron evaluates their
discussion in chapter 6 about reproductive freedom and its application to
genetic testing, counseling, and manipulation. Reproductive freedom
cannot be attached to an individual, according to Capron. Because this
freedom involves the decision about whether to procreate at all, the act
must encompass a reproducing couple. This lack of individual autonomy
further complicates issues of reproductive freedom and decisions
regarding genetic modification. Capron casts doubt on the authors’
conclusion that parents are morally wrong in not taking steps to prevent
overwhelming burdens to their children caused by genetic conditions.
Capron’s analysis questions whether the authors have stepped in an ironic
quagmire by attempting to prevent the eugenic abuses of the past.
Janet Radcliffe Richards, Reader in Bioethics at University College
London, examines the claim of the radical disability movement,
discussed in chapter 7, that genetic technology must not be used to
prevent or cure disability because this would imply that disabled people
were of less worth than the able. The authors of From Chance to
Choice: Genetics and Justice concede a great many of the radical
campaigners’ arguments, but claim that nevertheless the use of
technology to cure or prevent disability can be justified without any
denial of equal worth to the disabled.
Radcliffe Richards agrees with the authors’ conclusion that genetic
techniques should be used to prevent disability but, in How Not to End
Disability, argues that their justification is inadequate. First, they do not
sufficiently meet the radical argument that to try to prevent the existence
of these people is to imply that they are of unequal worth, because they
overlook an ambiguity in the idea of equal worth. Radcliffe Richards
explains that the authors are right to claim that their view allows the
disabled equal intrinsic worth, but detailed consideration of the radical
ideas shows that the movement’s distinctive concerns are with the lesser
instrumental value of disabled people. The authors’ claim does not meet
this concern, and in fact their case depends on regarding disabled
people as of lesser value in this and similar ways. Nevertheless, Radcliffe
Richards argues, the radical disability movement’s case still cannot be
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made out, because the authors concede too much in allowing the radical
claim that disability is largely a social construction. In fact, Radcliffe
Richards argues, no amount of social reorganization can turn disabilities
into abilities, or vice versa, and therefore by far the best way to end the
disadvantages of disabled people is to prevent or cure disability itself, by
whatever technological means are available.
In his critique, Richard J. Arneson, Professor of Philosophy at
University of California San Diego, takes a more global and theoretical
approach to the authors’ thesis. In Is Moral Theory Perplexed by New
Genetic Technology?, he claims that the authors exaggerated the extent
to which the moral issues posed by advances in genetic knowledge are
new and understated the resources of current moral theories to resolve
these issues in an intuitively satisfactory manner. According to Arneson,
this underestimation of current theory results from neglect of the
consequentalist family of views (these assert that one morally ought
always to do whatever will produce the best outcome). In this
connection Arneson finds prioritarianism to be especially promising.
Prioritarianism identifies the morally right action or policy with the one
that maximizes a function of human well-being that prefers greater to
lesser aggregate well-being but also gives priority to obtaining gains in
well-being for the worse off. Arneson contrasts the prioritarian approach
to the question, what is owed to the severely disabled, with the authors’
discussion of what they claimed to be the new problem of the morality
of inclusion. Arneson also compares the prioritarian approach to health
care justice with the approach embraced by the authors—the Rawlsian
fair equality of opportunity doctrine extended to include health care.
The tentative conclusion reached is that the degree of moral perplexity
induced by advances in genetic knowledge is less than the authors
proposed.
Rebecca Dresser, Professor of Law and Ethics in Medicine at
Washington University in St. Louis, seeks to further address two topics
that were not fully addressed by the authors of From Chance to
Choice: Genetics and Justice. In The Ethics of Genetic Intervention:
Human Research and Blurred Species Boundaries, Dresser focuses
primarily on ethical issues associated with researching genetic
interventions and the effects of interspecies genetic studies that may blur
the moral lines shaping our view of what is ethical genetic manipulation.
Dresser comments that genetic manipulation and germ line
intervention in embryos will require parents to allow their children to
undergo extended experimentation. Initial testing will likely be limited
to extreme cases where children face poor quality of life and where
conventional treatment techniques offer little hope for recovery or have
risk factors equal to, or greater than, genetic manipulation. Accurate
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analysis of the effectiveness of any procedure would require
randomized clinical testing in order to separate the results of genetic
intervention from environmental issues. Doing so could involve blind
testing, requiring parents to undergo in vitro procedures, possibly
receiving no genetic intervention as part of a control group. These
complicated decisions are compounded by the fact that scientists do not
currently have a standard of safety by which to evaluate potential
clinical interventions.
Dresser also believes that the authors failed to confront the broader
implications of genetic intervention for our perspective of distributive
justice. While the authors focused on the concept of justice only as it
applies to humans, Dresser indicates that the ability to alter the genetic
makeup of an organism allows scientists to blur traditional species lines
and raises accordant ethical concerns. How do we apply justice toward a
blurred species? If we add cognitive abilities to the great apes, at what
point do they become eligible for human-like treatment? Given our
current definition of disease as “adverse departures from normal species
functioning,” how do we apply a concept of normality to a transgenetic
species? Many questions remain unanswered, Dresser suggests.
Robert A. Bohrer, Professor of Law at California Western School of
Law, invokes a theoretical approach similar to that used by the authors
to address an issue that may arise as we gain a greater understanding of
the human genome: employer discrimination based on genetic profiling
for jobs involving toxic workplaces. In A Rawlsian Approach to Solving
the Problem of Genetic Discrimination in Toxic Workplaces, Bohrer
applies concepts from John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and examines
workplace discrimination apart from existing laws, like the Americans
with Disabilities Act. He presents a hypothetical situation: the risk of
glioblastoma, a fatal form of brain cancer, increases drastically for
persons with a certain genetic susceptibility when exposed to small
amounts of benzene. An employer could save a considerable amount of
money by not reducing the level of toxins in the workplace given that a
majority of workers are not threatened by the present level—only a
small percentage of potential employees would be likely to contract the
fatal cancer.
Bohrer argues for the implementation of a Rawlsian pay-to-exclude
system, when the appropriate ground rules are in place. Employers
could require genetic profiling for a given susceptibility and could refuse
to hire candidates with a high risk factor. Doing so would be beneficial
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to the employee (not being placed in harm’s way) as well as to the
employer. However, Rawlsian analysis also dictates that employers pay
into a central fund based on their realized savings from using genetic
testing so that individuals denied employment could be compensated for
their exclusion. This pay-to-exclude system would prevent employers
from using tests to exclude in cases where the cost of exposure is low,
would reduce the use of tests with questionable value, and would
encourage employers to reduce exposure to rare toxins.
Rawls’s theory is best applied when behind a veil of ignorance.
Bohrer believes that the Human Genome Project is a prime example for
such an analysis because we still know very little about the issues that
will become known. By setting ground rules now, we have the ability to
form the basis for ethical limits that are beneficial to society at large.
Michael H. Shapiro, Professor of Law at the University of Southern
California, authors the last piece of the collection. Rather than critiquing
the discussion in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, he
expands upon the subject matter and offers additional insight on a host
of moral, legal, and policy issues relating to human genetics. In Does
Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten Human Equality
and Democracy?, Professor Shapiro explores the technical aspects of
human genetics and relates these issues to legal and moral theories. He
delves into the concept of equality and questions whether measuring
equality is an appropriate means of evaluating moral and social justice.
A brief discussion follows regarding the way that merit attribute
enhancement might change the structure of our democratic institutions
to conform to the type of plural voting system envisioned by John
Stuart Mill. Potential constitutional issues are noted in addition to the
possibility that the moral and policy issues surrounding human genetics
will ultimately be debated within the legal system.
Shapiro proposes that several issues raised by the authors should be
further analyzed. First, he believes the concepts of merit and desert
should be further probed. Shapiro also believes a deeper concept of
justice should be examined, including its links to equality and to the way
in which all our basic values, including fairness, autonomy, and utility,
bear on each other. Finally, he favors a more thorough examination of
the potential withering of noncontingent bonds of duty and affection
between persons. Professor Shapiro ultimately concludes that the most
difficult aspect in determining how genetics will impact our value
system is the ambiguity in the system itself. Advances in technology
may undermine the assumptions that form the foundations of our current
value system.
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